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TRIAL BY ONE’S PEERS: THE NEED TO EXPAND 
JAPAN’S LAY JUDGE SYSTEM  
Harrison L.E. Owens†
Abstract: As a civil law-based country, Japan’s legal system has historically 
placed a strong emphasis on the formalistic application of code provisions to cases by 
professional judges without a jury.  Within the criminal justice system, prosecutors have 
played a highly significant role in all cases.  They exclusively make the decision to indict 
an alleged criminal, conduct investigation of crimes, initiate a criminal case, and they 
also control and supervise enforcement of a conviction.  In addition, the Prosecutors 
Office of Japan has historically emphasized the need to obtain a high rate of convictions 
to maintain the Japanese public’s trust in, and high regard for, the Office.  Critics have 
highlighted these factors as contributing to a criminal justice system that has displayed a 
disconcerting 99.8% conviction rate.  Although this phenomenon may be partially 
explained by prosecutors’ careful screening of cases and exercising of their discretion not 
to indict, a notable lack of external checks on the power of prosecutors has rendered the 
criminal justice system subject to considerable criticism in recent times.  This dynamic 
has raised concerns regarding the due process rights of defendants and led to long-
standing calls for reforms.  The 2009 adoption of a lay judge system in Japan, in which 
citizens participate in the decision-making process of certain criminal trials alongside 
professional judges, was directed at increasing the accountability of prosecutors and the 
transparency of the criminal justice process.  Although the majority of cases heard under 
the lay judge system have not demonstrated significant reductions in the conviction rate, 
there have been indications that the lay judge system counter-balances several concerning 
aspects of the Japanese criminal justice system.  This comment argues that Japan should 
expand the lay judge system beyond its current narrow scope to encompass either a 
greater variety of criminal cases or require that all criminal trials are heard by the lay 
judge system in order to more equally safeguard the due process rights of criminal 
defendants and decrease the expansive role played by Japanese prosecutors in the 
criminal trial process. 
I. INTRODUCTION
A high rate of conviction in a criminal justice system would normally 
warrant scrutiny—Japan’s conviction rate of 99.8% merits considerably 
more concern.1  Ryǌichi Hirano, a leading criminal justice scholar and 
former president of Tokyo University, described the Japanese criminal 
justice system as “abnormal” and “diseased.”2  This view is based in part on 
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1 Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 
317, 318–19 (1992) [hereinafter Foote, Benevolent Paternalism]. 
2 Ryǌichi Hirano, Genkǀ keijisoshǀ no shindan [Diagnosis of Current Criminal Procedure], in 4 
DANDƿ SHIGEMITSU HAKASE KOKI SHUKUGA RONBUNSHǋ [COLLECTION OF WORKS TO COMMEMORATE 
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the belief that there are no checks on the power of prosecutors, who play a 
central role in criminal justice proceedings.3  The Japanese criminal justice 
system appears to emphasize the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
offenders, but does so through close monitoring and intense investigation of 
those under suspicion to the disadvantage of personal autonomy.4  Placing 
significant trust in prosecutors and other authorities in the criminal justice 
system and broadly granting them discretion5 enables this close scrutiny. 
However, this trust and discretion is not accompanied by effective checks 
and balances, which is highlighted by prosecutorial mistakes and findings of 
unintentional or intentional bias within the system.6  When combined with 
the significant influence wielded by prosecutors in criminal justice 
proceedings, this lack of external accountability raises concerns regarding 
the transparency of a system that produces such a high conviction rate.7  
Japanese authorities, aware of these sentiments and the attendant concerns, 
have taken various steps to reform the criminal justice system in order to 
create a more balanced forum to prosecute defendants.8  The Japanese 
government established the Justice System Reform Council in 1999, which 
issued statements regarding the need for reforms to increase respect for 
individuals and popular sovereignty, and render the justice system more 
familiar and accessible to the general public.9  
One of the most significant reforms has been the implementation of a 
lay judge system in 2009.10  This new system mandates that a mixed panel of 
lay and professional judges hear certain cases to jointly determine the guilt 
                                                                                                                                                       
THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF DR. SHIGEMITSU DANDƿ] 407, 407 (Yasuhara Hiraba et al. eds., 1985), 
translated in 22 L. IN JAPAN 129, 129 (1989). 
3 Foote, Benevolent Paternalism, supra note 1, at 319, 321–22. 
4 Id. at 321. 
5 Marcia E. Goodman, The Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan, 5 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L. J. 16, 17–18, 59 (1986). 
6 Foote, Benevolent Paternalism, supra note 1, at 322;  see also Akira Kitani, Saibankan no 
shokumu [The Duties of Judges], in HƿGAKU SEMINƖ ZƿKAN, SƿGƿ TOKUSHǋ SHIRƮZU 27, GENDAI NO 
SAIBAN [HƿGAKU SEMINAR EXTRA NUMBER, SPECIAL COMPREHENSIVE SERIES NO. 27, PRESENT-DAY 
TRIALS] 243, 247–48 (1984) (describing the perceived difficulties of issuing an acquittal due to the high 
likelihood of attack on the judgment). 
7 See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 215 
(2002). 
8 See, e.g., JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/judicial_system/justice_system_reform.html (last visited Nov. 11, 
2015).  
9 Id. 
10 Saiban-in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru hǀritsu [Act Concerning Participation of Lay 
Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 [hereinafter Lay Assessors Act]. 
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and sentence of the defendant.11  However, at this time the scope of cases 
that these mixed panels may hear is limited to relatively serious cases that 
carry the potential for significant sentences.12
The implementation of a lay judge component in the Japanese 
criminal justice system may have a positive effect as a check on 
prosecutorial power and influence.  It will also introduce a novel perspective 
into prosecuting defendants and counter the lack of accountability and 
imbalance of power that the criminal justice system currently exhibits by 
imposing an external check on prosecutors.  As such, the lay judge system 
should be expanded beyond its limited role to encompass a wider range of 
criminal cases.  This broadening may take the form of either requiring lay 
judge panels to hear every criminal case, with an opt-out provision made 
available to defendants, or widening the variety of sentences requested in 
cases heard by lay judge panels.  Such an expansion would allow more 
defendants to benefit from a reduction in the formalistic approach to cases.  
This could lead to a lower conviction rate for those tried for criminal 
offenses, a check on the influence of prosecutors in the Japanese criminal 
justice system, and greater protection for criminal defendants’ due process 
rights. 
II. THE HISTORICAL STRUCTURE OF THE JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM
Generally, Japan is regarded as having a civil law system primarily 
based on the German model.13  This is due in part to its emphasis on codified 
law.  Japan’s first Constitution, known as the Meiji Constitution, was 
promulgated in 1889 and took effect in 1890 and reflected the restoration of 
the Emperor as the central figure in the Japanese political system.14  It also 
codified the rights and duties of Japanese citizens, which included 
guarantees of various basic liberties and due process rights.15  Guarantees of 
citizens’ rights were paralleled with the creation of a judiciary and system of 
courts in which these rights could be enforced.16  These included a 
conditional guarantee of public trials and the protection of judges’ 
                                                   
11 Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System:  Empowering the Public, Preserving Continental 
Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 126 (2009). 
12 Lay Assessors Act, supra note 10, art. 2, para. (i)–(ii). 
13 The World Factbook:  Japan, Government, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
14 DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPƿ [MEIJI KENPƿ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I.  
15 Id. ch. II. 
16 Id. ch. V.  
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positions.17  The Meiji Constitution was supplemented by the enactment of 
five major Codes that supplied the bulk of substantive Japanese law, which 
were divided into civil, civil procedure, criminal, criminal procedure, and 
commercial provisions.18  The Penal Code was promulgated in 1880 and 
enforced in 1882.19  Interestingly, Japan instituted a jury system for criminal 
trials in 1923.20  However, this system was suspended in 1943 and was not 
reinstituted following the end of World War II.21
The conclusion of World War II and the subsequent U.S. occupation 
of Japan brought several significant changes to the Japanese legal system.  
Foremost among these changes was the adoption of a new Japanese 
Constitution in 1947 that was heavily influenced by the U.S. Occupation.22  
This new Constitution expanded the rights of citizens, including the 
guarantee of due process rights and access to courts.23  In addition, the new 
Constitution articulated the structure of the modern Japanese court system.24
The tiered court system provided for in the Japanese Constitution 
remains in place today.  Article 76 vests all judicial power in the Supreme 
Court and inferior courts, which are all incorporated into a unitary national 
judicial system.25  The Supreme Court is the court of last resort, and hears 
certain appeals and cases examining the constitutionality of any law, order, 
rule, or disposition.26  The preceding tier of the Japanese justice system is 
composed of High Courts, each of which is made up of a President and other 
High Court judges.27  These High Courts generally hear appeals against 
judgments rendered in District and Summary Courts, and as such may 
review cases heard by lay judge panels.  Three-judge panels hear most cases, 
although five-judge panels hear insurrection cases.28  Crimes of insurrection 
                                                   
17 Id. ch. V, arts. 58, 59. 
18 Jody Chafee, et al., Introduction:  Nature of the Japanese Legal System, 1 BUS. L. IN JAPAN 3, 3 
(2008). 
19 Ken Mukai & Nobuyoshi Toshitani (D.F. Henderson trans.), The Progress and Problems of 
Compiling the Civil Code in the Early Meiji Era, in 1 L. IN JAPAN:  AN ANNUAL 25, 26 n.1 (1967). 
20 Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923. 
21 Baisinho no Teishi ni Kansuru Horitsu [An Act to Suspend the Jury Act], Law No. 88 of 1943. 
22 Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of Constitution and Its Various Influences, 53 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 17, 22–29 (1990).  
23 NIHONKOKU KENPƿ [KENPƿ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 31, 32. 
24 Id. ch. VI. 
25 Id. art. 76. 
26 Id. art. 81. 
27 U.N. Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Criminal 
Justice in Japan, 5 (2011), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/CJSJ_2011/00CJSJ_2011.pdf [hereinafter 
Criminal Justice in Japan]. 
28 Id.
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concern actions of individuals or groups attempting to overthrow the 
government of Japan, or otherwise subvert the constitutional order.29  Such 
cases, along with judicial disciplinary actions, are required to be heard by a 
five-judge panel under Japanese law.30
District Courts are the courts of first instance for many cases, except 
for those reserved for Summary Courts (minor crimes) and High Courts 
(insurrection crimes and judicial discipline cases).31  Historically, a single 
judge tried the majority of cases, with three-judge panels hearing criminal 
cases involving possible sentences of death, life imprisonment, or 
imprisonment with a minimum period of more than one year.32  It is within 
these District Courts that the new lay judge system is now applied to certain 
types of offenses.33
A. The Historical Role of Judges in the Japanese Criminal Justice 
System 
Countries with civil law systems rely on comprehensive codes that are 
designed to articulate all foreseeable offenses, applicable court procedures, 
and sentences assigned to each type of offense.34  This contrasts with 
common law systems, which use both legislatively-created statutes and 
precedent established by judges in past cases as authority.35  As a result, the 
roles of judges in common law and civil law systems are very different as 
well.  Common law judges are given discretion to interpret and apply the 
law to the facts of a given case, and their decisions may become precedent 
for later cases.36  In contrast, civil law judges are only expected to apply 
code provisions to the facts presented by each case, necessarily restricting 
their discretion in interpreting the implicated provisions.37  Although the 
Japanese legal system has adopted several aspects of common law systems, 
                                                   
29 See generally KEIHƿ [PEN. CODE] part II, ch. II.  
30 Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary:  Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, 53 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 145–146 (1990). 
31 Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 27, at 5;  NIHONKOKU KENPƿ [KENPƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 
81.  
32 See Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 27, at 5. 
33 Id.
34 The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L.,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/pdf/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf, 1 (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Common Law and Civil Law Traditions]. 
35 Id.
36 See Geoffrey Hazard, Responsibilities of Judges and Advocates in Civil and Common Law:  Some 
Lingering Misconceptions Concerning Civil Lawsuits, 39 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 59, 64–68 (2006) 
(comparing the levels of discretion possessed by civil and common law judges). 
37 Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, supra note 34, at 1. 
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such as the 1948 implementation of direct and cross-examination of 
witnesses,38 the role of judges is still relatively restricted compared to their 
common law counterparts. 
The Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan are appointed by the 
Cabinet, except for the Chief Justice, who is appointed by the Emperor after 
being nominated by the Cabinet.39  A majority of Japanese judges begin their 
careers immediately upon graduation from the Legal Training and Research 
Institute, and spend their entire career within the court system.40  Lower 
court judges may also be appointed by the Cabinet, and are selected from a 
list of nominations submitted by the Supreme Court.41  To be eligible for 
selection, an individual must have practiced law as an assistant judge, a 
public prosecutor, an attorney, or a law professor for at least ten years.42  
These practices ensure that Japanese judges are highly attuned to the 
practices of the Japanese legal system and its civil law structure, either 
through prior practice or by spending their entire career on the bench. 
Recently, the role of judges has shifted away from its historical civil 
law confines to be more proactive and closer to parity with the role of 
prosecutors.43  This shift has been primarily embodied by judges taking an 
active role in policymaking through the conscious shaping of legal standards 
with policy considerations in mind.44  This practice is exemplified by the 
Japanese Supreme Court’s Shiratori decision, which expanded previously 
narrow interpretations of defendants’ right to retrial when clear evidence was 
discovered.45  This decision marked a significant departure from prior 
interpretations, and enunciated a clear standard rather than brief and abstract 
constitutional or statutory language.46  Over the past two decades, there have 
been additional signs of the judiciary taking a more active role in the 
criminal justice field.  For example, judges have begun to closely scrutinize 
                                                   
38 Caslav Pejovic, Civil Law and Common Law:  Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 817, 834, n. 43 (2001). 
39 Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 27, at 6. 
40  John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary:  Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the Public Trust, in
LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
41 Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 27, at 6.
42 Id.
43 See Daniel H. Foote, Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field, 72 J.
OF THE JAPANESE ASS’N FOR SOC. OF L. 6, 7 (2010) [hereinafter Foote, Policymaking]. 
44 Id.
45   See Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]  May 20, 1975 (1st P.B.), 29 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHǋ
[KEISHǋ] 177 (holding that Article 435, item 6 of the Code of Criminal procedure, which grants the 
right to retrial when newly-discovered, clear evidence requires reversal of a prior conviction, would be 
evaluated under the comprehensive evaluation and reasonable doubt standards). 
46 Foote, Policymaking, supra note 43, at 13. 
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confession statements offered by prosecutors, culminating with the Supreme 
Court upholding a Tokyo High Court order that prosecutors disclose 
investigative records, including police memoranda, so that a confession’s 
voluntariness can be evaluated.47  
Similarly, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations has enacted 
reforms that significantly expand defendants’ rights of access to counsel, 
such as allowing suspects to meet with a lawyer once free of charge with the 
costs financed by bar associations.48  In addition, there have been marked 
developments of the right to publicly-provided counsel to indigents 
beginning with the suspect stage, establishment of a statutorily-based 
discovery system, institution of pre-trial coordination procedures intended to 
expedite trials, and a variety of other reforms based on recommendations 
from the Justice System Reform Counsel.49  The Supreme Court’s role as the 
institution charged with responsibility for judicial administration ensured 
that the Court was heavily involved in developing the legislation enacting 
these reforms, and has since been active in the implementation and 
interpretation of the new practices.50  These upward trends of judicial 
proactivity and defense counsel’s parity with prosecutors has continued to 
the present day and percolated down to the lower courts of Japan, as 
evidenced by an upward trend of judges rejecting prosecutorial requests for 
detention of suspects since 2003, rising to a rate of 1.6% in 2013.51  
B. The Role of Prosecutors in the Japanese Criminal Justice System 
The Prosecutors Office of Japan is composed of the Supreme Public 
Prosecutors Office, eight High Public Prosecutors Offices, fifty District 
Public Prosecutors Offices, and 438 Local Public Prosecutors Offices.52  
Prosecutors represent the public interest against criminal defendants.  
Though they fall under the executive power vested in the Cabinet, 
prosecutors are guaranteed independence from the political process.53  Prior 
to World War II, this independence was implicitly accorded to prosecutors 
                                                   
47 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 25, 2007 (3rd P.B.), 61 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHǋ
[KEISHǋ] 895.
48 See Foote, Policymaking, supra note 43, at 36. 
49 Id. at 36–37. 
50 Id. at 37. 
51 Daniel H. Foote, Faculty of Law, Univ. of Tokyo and Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Address at the 
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting: Criminal Justice Reforms in Japan (Act 1):  A Changing 
Dynamic for Prosecutors? (May 30, 2015) [hereinafter Foote, Criminal Justice Reforms]. 
52 Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 27, at 3.  
53 Id. at 4. 
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despite their placement within the structure of the Ministry of Justice.54  
Following the occupation of Japan by the United States, the Japanese 
criminal justice system was fundamentally altered, but the independence of 
prosecutors was retained.55  In contrast, the United States is the only country 
in the world where prosecutors are generally elected by popular vote.56  The 
U.S. approach was designed to give citizens greater control over the 
government, eliminate patronage appointments, and increase the 
responsiveness of prosecutors to the communities they served.57  In practice, 
the Japanese prosecutors’ independence is manifested by their  high level of 
discretion in pursuit of their goals; prosecutors have the ability to investigate 
crimes and indict criminal suspects, and also may suspend the prosecution of 
defendants.58  The prosecutor must establish every element of the charged 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.59  
 Japan has been described as a system of “substantive justice,” in 
contrast to a “procedural justice” system such as that of the United States.60  
Historically, the Japanese criminal justice system has been structured to 
uncover the “truth” as the first step in the justice process.61  Supporters of 
this system have argued that it was effective in controlling crime, as evinced 
by Japan’s low crime rate, a high clearance rate of criminal cases, and a 
relatively small prison population.62  However, this led to a parallel de-
emphasis on the importance of suspects’ individual rights  and a focus on 
obtaining confessions regardless of whether suspects’ rights were violated in 
the process.63  When coupled with the independence accorded to prosecutors 
                                                   
54 A. Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 38, 39 
(1997). 
55 Id. 
56 Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L. J. 1528, 1530 (2012). 
57 Id. at 1531. 
58 Castberg, supra note 54, at 39–40. 
59 SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN JAPAN 24 (2013), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/vcms_lf/20140417-criminal-design.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) 
[hereinafter OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE].  
60 Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan’s Convictions:  The Lay Judge System and the Rights of 
Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1430 (2008). 
61 Jean Choi DeSombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System:  An Examination of Pretrial Rights of the Criminally Accused in Japan and the United States, 14 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 103, 103 (1995). 
62 Matthew Wilson, The Dawn of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan:  Success on the Horizon?, 24 WISC.
INT’L L. J. 835, 836–37 (2007) (noting that Japan is proud of its judicial system, and that the judiciary does 
not consider the system as in need of repair);  Nicholas D. Kristof, A Safer Society -- A Special Report.; 
Japanese Say No to Crime:  Tough Methods, at a Price, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 1995), http://www.nytimes.c
om/1995/05/14/world/safer-society-special-report-japanese-say-no-crime-tough-methods-
price.html?pagewanted=all.  
63 David A. Seuss, Paternalism Versus Pugnacity:  The Right to Counsel in Japan and the United 
States, 72 IND. L. J. 291, 319 (1996). 
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and their drive to acquire convictions in cases brought to trial, as discussed 
below, these forces converged to create a system that lacks external checks, 
which created considerable cause for concern. 
Although the Court controls the proceedings of the case, the 
prosecutor plays a fundamental role in bringing the case and developing  
facts at trial.  When a crime first occurs, the Public Prosecutors Office may 
take over after the police carry out their own investigation and subsequently 
refer the case to the Office.64  However, the Public Prosecutors Office may 
also initiate its own criminal investigation and arrest suspects, without a 
preceding police investigation and referral.65  The investigations conducted 
by the Public Prosecutors Office are intensive and centered around the 
questioning of suspects, with a consequent emphasis placed on non-verbatim 
“confession statements” and “witness statements.”66  These “confession 
statements” have been described as short, stereotyped, largely abstract, 
reconstructed accounts drafted in order to closely mirror the legal elements 
of the crime being charged.67  Following the completion of the investigation, 
prosecutors have complete discretion to charge or not charge the suspect, 
although internal checks within the Prosecutors Office may limit this 
freedom.68  If prosecutors elect to charge the suspect, they exercise 
significant control and supervision over the subsequent trial, which takes 
place even if a confession or guilty plea has been obtained from the 
suspect.69  Finally, prosecutors are responsible for supervising the execution 
of judgments imposed upon guilty defendants.70
Although there are similarities in the functions of Japanese and U.S. 
prosecutors, there are significant differences in the means by which they 
perform such functions and the final results produced by their work.  The 
                                                   
64 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICE AND THE COURSE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/CRAB/crab-02-1.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).  
65 Id.
66 Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 
418 n.15, 424 (1991) [hereinafter Foote, Confessions]. 
67 Id. at 418. 
68 Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 27, at 3;  Group 2, The Role of Prosecution in the Screening 
of Criminal Cases, in U.N. Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
1997 Annual Report & Resource Material Series No. 53, 326, 343 (1998) [hereinafter The Role of 
Prosecution in the Screening of Criminal Cases].  
69 OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 59, at 21–30;  U.N. Asia & Far E. Inst. for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, The Criminal Justice System in Japan:  Prosecution, 
in U.N. Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 1997 Annual Report & 
Resource Material 53, 39, 42 (1998), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No53/No53_10FP.pdf
[hereinafter The Criminal Justice System in Japan:  Prosecution]. 
70 The Criminal Justice System in Japan:  Prosecution, supra note 69, at 41. 
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education of Japanese prosecutors is centralized at the Legal Training and 
Research Institute, and the Prosecutors Office is nationally centralized.71  
While attending the Legal Training and Research Institute, students undergo 
a one-year training course consisting of two months of collective training 
and a series of two-month periods of experience-based learning with district 
courts, district public prosecutor’s offices, and bar associations.72  This 
curriculum essentially provides students with apprenticeships within a 
variety of practice areas, in contrast to the almost purely academic legal 
training in the United States.73  Another important aspect of this approach to 
legal education is that  all entrants to the legal profession are exposed to the 
Prosecutors Office’s culture and methods prior to beginning their practice. 
The culture of the Prosecutors Office merits discussion with regard to 
how it influences the attitude prosecutors take toward charging suspects and 
conducting criminal trials.  As discussed above, Japan has historically 
accorded significant discretion and independence to prosecutors, especially 
regarding the decision to indict.74  The decision of whether to indict is 
considered central to the role of Japanese prosecutors, and as a result 
prosecutors have been known to pay less attention to advocacy and 
evidentiary presentation at trial than to the investigation and interrogation 
aspects of the criminal justice process.75  This independence and focus on 
investigations is quickly internalized by new prosecutors, and the frequent 
rotation of prosecutors between offices ensures that there is a high level of 
consistency from office to office across Japan, stemming from shared norms 
and professional goals.76  There is also a high level of consistency in the pre-
reform goals of prosecutors across the Office, with a significant majority 
placing “discovering the truth” and “proper charge decisions” as the primary 
objectives, above even “protecting the public.”77
Several other fundamental characteristics of the Prosecutors Office 
might explain the high rate of convictions seen in criminal cases brought to 
trial.  First, there has been a long-standing emphasis on obtaining 
                                                   
71 Castberg, supra note 54, at 40. 
72 The Legal Training and Research Institute of Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/institute_01/institute/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).  
73 Castberg, supra note 54, at 41. 
74 B. J. George, Jr., Discretionary Authority of Public Prosecutors in Japan, 17 L. IN JAPAN 42, 48 
(1984). 
75 Masahito Inouye, Waseda Law Sch. Faculty, Address at the Law and Society Association Annual 
Meeting:  Criminal Justice Reform in Japan Act II (May 30, 2015). 
76 Castberg, supra note 54, at 43–44. 
77 JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY, supra note 7, at 98 (Table 3.1:  Prosecutor Objectives in Japan and 
the United States). 
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confessions from suspects because of the view that they are the best 
evidence of truth, and because confessions reportedly played an important 
role in maintaining public trust in the early Japanese criminal justice 
process.78  In addition, there is a strong trend of prosecutors deciding not to 
indict, which is called “suspension of prosecution.”79  Prosecutors may 
decide to suspend prosecution when they feel that society and the defendant 
would not benefit from punishment being meted out.80  This is codified in 
the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that public 
prosecution may not be instituted when it is unnecessary to prosecute based 
on the character, age, and environment of an offender, and the weight, 
circumstances, and conditions surrounding the offense.81  Scholars have 
postulated that this practice began shortly after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 
as a means of reducing the number of minor criminal cases burdening the 
early court system, and has been retained due to its focus on rehabilitation 
rather than its administrative efficiency.82  This practice may contribute to 
the remarkably high conviction rate achieved by the Japanese criminal 
justice system, as it allows prosecutors flexibility in their decision whether 
to bring indictments in borderline cases.  However, this decision still 
remains entirely within the remit of the prosecutors themselves.  That 
prosecutors have flexibility in deciding does not alleviate potential concerns 
raised by the lack of external checks on Japan’s criminal justice system. 
The wide latitude of influence and discretion accorded to public 
prosecutors under the pre-reform criminal justice system is often cited by 
critics as the primary driving force behind its disconcerting conviction rate 
of 99.8%.83  Others argue that the entire criminal justice system, as currently 
structured, favors the prosecution by emphasizing the power of prosecutors 
to elicit confessions from suspects and independently conduct their own 
investigations into crimes.84  For example, the prosecutors or police can hold 
a criminal suspect in pretrial detention for up to twenty-three days without 
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access to counsel.85  In addition, evidence in criminal trials has historically 
been largely limited to written documentation prepared by the prosecution, 
especially confession statements.86  The defense counsel’s role was 
significantly diminished, creating what scholars termed a “cooperative 
adversary system.”87  Finally, judges reported that they felt as if they were 
simply “confirming the results of the investigation” under the pre-reform 
system.88  These roles and viewpoints illustrate the significant difference in 
power held by prosecutors relative to defense counsel and judges under the 
pre-reform criminal justice system. 
Alternatively, the prosecutor’s role in the Japanese criminal justice 
system may be viewed as a “screening” mechanism for cases that increases 
the efficiency of the system.89  “Case screening” is defined as a series of 
procedural steps that forms the decision as to whether to proceed with a 
criminal case in a court of law or whether it should be concluded by any 
other means.90  Advocates of this prosecutorial function emphasize that the 
process increases the overall efficiency in a system by dispensing of cases 
lacking merit and ensuring that the proper person is being accused.91  
Another argument proffered to help explain the significant conviction 
rates exhibited by the Japanese criminal justice system pertains to the 
potential incentives for prosecutors to obtain confessions.  For example, the 
historical emphasis placed on obtaining confessions may have led 
prosecutors to go to extreme measures to coerce confessions that supported 
their cases.92  This historical emphasis survived even after post-World War II 
American Occupation authorities established new rights for defendants, such 
as the warning requirement and right to silence, as subsequent statutory 
modifications significantly undermined these protections.93  Also, stories 
have emerged of innocent citizens confessing to crimes they did not commit 
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after being subjected to lengthy interrogations and holding periods by the 
police and prosecutors.94  In addition, several instances of miscarriages of 
justice in death penalty cases came to light, which contributed to a 
widespread public perception that trials were essentially ceremonial rather 
than substantive forums for trying criminal defendants with no real 
presumption of innocence.95  These anecdotes suggest that the emphasis 
placed on confessions, coupled with the significant power and discretion 
accorded to prosecutors, is a significant concern.  As such, they highlight the 
need to institute checks on the Japanese criminal justice process that will 
counteract the power of prosecutors and accord greater protections to the 
rights of criminal defendants. 
III. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN JAPAN
Although the Japanese Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the 
due process rights of defendants, two provisions have been interpreted to 
collectively guarantee this right.  Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution 
states that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, or suffer imposition 
of a criminal penalty, except according to procedure established by law.96  
Article 32 provides that no person shall be denied their right of access to the 
court system.97  Article 31 requires that any restriction on the rights and 
liberties of Japanese citizens be preceded by at least procedural due 
process.98  Article 32 represents the closest equivalent to procedural due 
process as it appears in the U.S. Constitution, stating that “[n]o person shall 
be denied the right of access to the courts.”99
 In actual practice, due process in Japan may accord significantly less 
protection than its U.S. counterpart, in spite of these constitutional 
provisions.100  Although the post-World War II Occupation Authorities  
hoped to achieve “‘fundamental change of the criminological attitude’ in 
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Japan” through constitutional protections and statutory revisions, current 
practice does not reflect a strong commitment to these principles.101  First, 
the Constitution’s specific language, although relatively similar to that of the 
United States, is narrower than even the rhetoric of the Occupation 
authorities.102  Second, Japanese courts have narrowly interpreted 
constitutional provisions in order to safeguard the significant levels of 
discretion accorded to investigative authorities such as police and 
prosecutors.103  For example, although Article 35 of the Japanese 
Constitution protects citizens against searches and seizures, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides an exception for searches incident to arrest.104  
Japanese courts have allowed for a wide application of this exception, 
requiring only “a connection, in time, between search and seizure…and 
arrest…but which comes first…is not relevant.”105  When combined with the 
prosecutor’s significant discretion to conduct investigations into suspected 
criminal acts, this wide interpretation of the exception to a constitutional 
protection demonstrates how the rights of defendants may be circumscribed 
under the existing framework of Japanese criminal law. 
Another contrast regarding due process rights between Japan and the 
United States is the nature of pretrial rights accorded to criminal defendants 
by courts.  In the United States, there is a historical emphasis on procedural 
justice in order to protect the constitutional rights of the accused.106  As 
discussed below, several commentators view the relevant provisions of the 
Japanese Constitution as guaranteeing very similar procedural due process 
rights to the accused in Japan.107  Alternatively, scholars argue the Japanese 
criminal justice system emphasizes substantive justice that focuses on 
achieving a just result, rather than simply ensuring just process.108  Critics 
argue this emphasis may incentivize courts to find an accused guilty as 
opposed to protecting his or her rights, using the prosecutor’s significant 
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discretion to obtain confessions as an example.109  The characteristics of this 
pro-prosecution approach to confessions include the accused’s duty to 
submit to questioning upon arrest or detention, the exclusion of defense 
counsel during interrogation, and prosecutorial discretion to designate the 
time, place, and duration of a meeting between the accused and his 
counsel.110  Although several judicial decisions have placed procedural limits 
on pre-prosecution detention, such practices have recently drawn criticism in 
Japan and internationally as a primary cause of wrongful arrests, coerced 
confessions, and convictions of innocents.111  When combined with 
prosecutors’ focus on obtaining confessions from suspects as a dispositive 
part of the later trial process, these pro-prosecution characteristics of 
interrogations likely play a significant role in the ability of prosecutors to 
maintain a high proportion of convictions in the cases brought to trial.112
IV. THE NEW JAPANESE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM
The wide discretion afforded to Japanese prosecutors, and the  
consequent disadvantage to defendants, has led to several reform attempts of 
the Japanese criminal justice system to create a more balanced forum.  These 
reform efforts have included providing counsel for suspects prior to 
indictment at public expense and other steps to strengthen the defense 
counsel’s role throughout the trial process, including the videotaping of 
interrogations and confessions (discussed further below).113  Further steps 
taken to balance the power held by prosecutors and defense counsel consist 
of expanding the discovery system, as well as deemphasizing the use of 
written witness and confession statements (which are non-verbatim under 
Japanese practice), in favor of in-court testimony by live witnesses subject to 
cross-examination.114  The calls for such reforms have spanned decades, but 
only recently have begun to be implemented.115  Although these new 
practices constitute a significant constellation of reforms toward 
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guaranteeing the rights of suspects and defendants, they have been 
insufficient.116
The lack of efficacy demonstrated by prior reforms has in part led to  
enactment of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal 
Trials (“Lay Assessors Act”), which in turn led to the implementation of a 
lay judge system in 2009.117  In the years leading up to enactment of the Lay 
Assessors Act, two schools of thought emerged regarding the best format for 
the new lay judge system.  One of these schools advocated for an Anglo-
American type of jury system for the purpose of democratizing the highly 
bureaucratic Japanese judiciary system and preventing miscarriages of 
justice by judges.118  The second school preferred the adoption of a 
Continental-European type of mixed panel court consisting of professional 
judges and lay persons, which would prevent mistakes by inexperienced 
juries and insufficient appellate remedies due to a lack of a detailed reason 
for the jury verdict.119  The lay judge system ultimately enacted by the 
Japanese criminal justice reformers reflects the Continental-European mixed 
panel format.120
It has been argued that the introduction of the lay judge system will 
act as an essential step toward allowing prior reforms to gain more 
effectiveness and achieve their goal of changing the Japanese criminal 
justice system.121  This legislation mandated that criminal trials in District 
Courts involving crimes punishable by death, imprisonment for an indefinite 
period,122 or imprisonment with hard labor be heard by a mixed panel of lay 
judges and professional judges.123  These mixed panels would also hear 
cases in which the victim died as a result of an intentional criminal act.124  
Establishing an adjudicatory body composed of lay citizens was intended to 
expand the decision-making process in criminal trials to be more 
representative of the views of the general public, and to introduce a greater 
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degree of transparency and accountability into the Japanese criminal justice 
system.125
Cases covered by the Lay Assessors Act are heard by either a panel of 
three professional judges and six lay judges, or a panel consisting of four lay 
judges and the Chief Judge.126  The lay judges involved in such panels are 
selected by lottery from the general population, based on voter rolls.127  
However, there are also several reasons why an individual may not serve as 
a lay judge, including not having completed the requisite compulsory 
education, currently serving as or having served as a judge or lawyer, or by 
being a National Diet member.128  Some individuals are permitted to decline 
being selected as a lay judge on the grounds of being seventy years or older, 
being a student, having served as a lay judge within the past five years at the 
time of selection, or having been involved in a related case.129
The new system mandates that lay judges play an active role in the 
trial and the court’s decision-making process.  In contrast to jurors in the 
United States, lay judges in the Japanese system are able to question 
witnesses concerning dispositive issues in the cases that the lay judges will 
assist in deciding.130  Similarly, lay judges may question the victims or 
victims’ counsel regarding the meaning of their testimony, or the defendant 
if he or she makes a voluntary statement.131  Deliberations regarding the trial 
are conducted with empaneled judges and lay judges, and lay judges are 
required to express their opinion regarding the case.132  Throughout the 
process, the presiding judge acts as an educator regarding the applicable law 
and precedent, but does not necessarily control the deliberation process.133  
Finally, the verdict issued by the court is reached by a majority opinion of 
the panel, which must include both a professional judge and a lay judge.134  
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If there is a divergence of opinion regarding the length of sentence 
and no majority that meets the requirements of the statute, an opinion is 
formed by adding the number of least favorable opinions to the number of 
opinions for the next favorable position until a majority is achieved.135  All 
of these aspects of the lay judge system indicate a much greater level of 
involvement and participation of lay judges in the trial process than jurors in 
the United States, and demonstrate why their inclusion in the Japanese 
criminal justice system may significantly impact the existing pro-
prosecution dynamic of Japanese courts. 
An interesting aspect of lay judges beyond their active participation is 
the restrictions placed on their interaction with the public and press.  
Throughout the trial, lay judges are exposed to new ways of viewing the 
criminal justice process and its impact on society through their engagement 
with each stage of the trial process.136  However, lay judges are unlikely to 
share these views of the criminal justice process system with the general 
public under the current provisions of the Lay Assessors Act.  For example, 
the Lay Assessors Act bars lay judges from disclosing secrets learned during 
deliberation or other privileged information learned in the exercise of their 
duties following the conclusion of a trial.137  This broad prohibition—which 
applies to the subjective opinions of lay judges, the opinions of other 
participants in the deliberations, and the number of those who held such 
opinions138—limits the press and public’s awareness of courts’ decision-
making processes, which is especially concerning given the significant cases 
lay judges oversee.  These provisions are quite strict, as any violation is 
subject to punishment of a fine up to ¥500,000 and/or imprisonment for a 
term up to six months.139  The restrictions are also vague enough to apply to 
almost any information related to the deliberations.  As such, several critics 
warn that if professional judges are not open to allowing lay judges to 
participate in deliberations, these provisions will inhibit the disclosure of 
these practices.140  Therefore, they may hinder the introduction of increased 
transparency in the criminal justice system, despite the inclusion of lay 
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judges, and reduce the ability of the public to learn how a conviction and 
sentence were decided.   
Even more broadly, lay judges may not commit acts that will injure 
the public’s trust in the fairness of the trial or harm the dignity of the trial.141  
Similar to the restrictions regarding information gained during deliberations 
or the trial by lay judges, these provisions do not supply any examples or 
explanations of what types of activities may violate the restrictions.  While 
the confidentiality provisions may reflect a desire to protect the rights of lay 
judges and ensure that an open discussion may be conducted without fear of 
later repercussions, they also appear designed to prevent the lay judge 
system from generating additional criticism of the judiciary.142  This 
perception has garnered significant criticism from the mass media, who 
argue that the confidentiality provisions impose sharp limits on whether lay 
judges can talk about their experiences in any significant capacity.143  In 
addition, these issues may potentially be left to the discretion of the 
professional judges involved with the trial at issue.  If this is the case, there 
may be a significant chilling effect on how lay judges interact with the press 
and public regarding the trial process.  Any violations of these provisions are 
also subject to a significant fine and potential imprisonment.144  When 
coupled with the restrictions placed on lay judges regarding information 
from deliberations and the trial process and the harsh penalties assigned to 
disclosure, the broad and vague prohibitions on harming the dignity of the 
trial likely act as a factor inhibiting any increase in the transparency of the 
Japanese criminal justice system. 
V. IMPACT OF THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM THUS FAR 
A. Overall Impact on the Conviction Rate 
The characteristics of the approach described earlier by the Japanese 
criminal justice system to defendants’ due process rights are worrisome, as 
they appear to prioritize achieving convictions over enforcing constitutional 
protections.  When combined with the wide latitude accorded prosecutors to 
investigate criminal incidents and elicit confessions and judicial incentives 
to deal with cases efficiently, it is perhaps unsurprising that the conviction 
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rate achieved by Japanese prosecutors stands at 99.8%.  The lay judge 
system, which introduces ordinary citizens’ views into courts’ decision-
making processes, is designed to increase the accused’s due process rights.  
However, the scope of trials heard by lay judges is currently restricted to 
very serious cases, and it is therefore unlikely that lay judges would be able 
to greatly alter the existing overall convictions rate. 
Statistics have suggested that the narrow scope of cases heard by the 
lay judge system may in fact hinder its overall impact.  For example, 
although the lay judge system was meant to temper the power of prosecutors 
and ensure that defendants are accorded the full extent of their rights, in one 
category of cases lay judges have actually tended toward more severe 
penalties than seen under the previous system.145  Specifically, lay judges 
have demonstrated a tendency to impose disproportionately harsh 
punishments on perpetrators of sex crimes than in the past.146  In fact, in two 
such trials the sentences handed down by lay judges exceeded the sentence 
demanded by the prosecutors.147  Despite these harsher sentences, the public 
and even several members of the judiciary reacted positively to the decisions 
due to the perception that the prior sentencing scheme for such actions was 
too lenient.148  From this perspective, the lay judge system’s assignment of 
harsher sentences in some cases comports with the goals of the system, as 
this practice may reflect the sentiments of the general public more closely.  
Therefore, rather than a cause of concern, these cases may represent the lay 
judge system’s achievement of its goal to more accurately represent the 
views of the public in the criminal justice process.  It must be noted, 
however, that this trend may face opposition in light of a recent Supreme 
Court decision that altered the term handed down by a lay judge panel to 
reduce the prison sentence of a couple convicted for fatally abusing their 
one-year-old daughter in 2010.149  The five-judge First Petty Bench 
unanimously decided to shorten the fifteen-year sentences handed down by 
the lay judge, which exceeded the ten-year sentences sought by the 
prosecutors.150  The Supreme Court stated that “[s]entences given at lay 
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judge trials should be respected, but their fairness compared with the results 
of other trials should be maintained.”151  This position may indicate that 
future lay judge sentences that significantly exceed those sought by 
prosecutors can be subject to scrutiny and reversal on appeal. 
In addition, over the first three years of the lay judge system, the 
acquittal rate of mixed panel trials was under 0.5%, a relatively insignificant 
variation from the acquittal rate under the prior system.152  Although this 
may be seen as a signal that the system has failed in its ultimate purpose or 
that lay judges are overly focused on the plight of the victim, some critics 
argue that this phenomenon is counter-balanced by a decrease in the number 
of death penalty sentences and an increase in the proportion of deferred 
judgment probation rates.153  Deferred judgment probation is an alternative 
form of sentencing in which a court gives the defendant probation, and 
dismisses the criminal case entirely after probation is successfully 
completed.154  It has also been reported that Japanese lay judges empathize 
with both victims and defendants, and regard their duty of determining guilt 
and sentencing the defendant seriously.155  In addition, another factor that 
may be at play regarding the lack of a significant change in the conviction 
rate may be prosecutors’ careful screening of borderline cases that will be 
heard by lay judge panels, or charging lesser crimes that would avoid such 
review.156  In light of these countervailing factors, there may be other 
explanations for the lack of variation in acquittal rates between the lay judge 
system and the prior professional judge system. 
B. Drug Smuggling Cases 
An interesting category of cases that has diverged from the previous 
professional judge system’s trends involves drug smuggling.  The regulation 
of illicit substances in Japan is governed primarily through four statutes: 1) 
the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law;157 2) the Cannabis Control 
Law;158 3) the Opium Law;159 and 4) the Stimulants Control Law.160  The 
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Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law was designed to regulate and 
supervise the production, distribution, and use of narcotics, and was also 
aimed at treating narcotics addicts.161  It applied to a significant number of 
substances, and assigned penal sanctions to offenders.162  The Cannabis 
Control Law similarly imposes harsh penal sanctions on offenders, with 
possession of relatively small amounts being punishable by five-year prison 
sentences and illegally growing cannabis being punishable by seven-year 
prison sentences.163  The Opium Law, enacted in 1954, was less stringent as 
it allowed farmers to grow opium poppies with permission from the Minister 
of Health and Welfare to ensure that narcotics used for medical purposes 
remained available.164  The Stimulant Control Law, first enacted in 1951, 
assigned ten years imprisonment and a significant fine to traffickers and 
manufacturers, and these penalties steadily increased through 1990.165  
Taken together, these laws form a statutory scheme that was enacted in 
response to significant drug problems in post-war Japan, and therefore 
reflected the harsh approach taken toward drug offenders. 
Following World War II, Japan saw a dramatic increase in the rate of 
drug abuse, particularly stimulants.166  Japan suffered significant public 
health effects from this trend, such as rising rates of amphetamine psychosis 
and narcotics addiction among the population.167  In response to these 
increasingly negative public health impacts, and influenced by the U.S. 
Occupation authorities, Japan enacted a series of aggressive anti-drug laws 
that formed the basis for the legislative response against rising substance 
abuse.168  Historically, Japanese authorities have treated violations of anti-
drug laws very harshly and pursued violations aggressively; at one point 
one-third of Japanese inmates had been sentenced for violating anti-drug 
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laws.169  This high proportion of incarcerations based on drug offenses stems 
partly from the broad scope of Japan’s anti-drug statutes, coupled with the 
lengthy sentences assigned to drug offenders.170  The harsh treatment of drug 
offenders, and the wide range of offenses that merit such punishment, may 
be due in part to education programs that place the cause of addiction on 
poor self-control, rather than social conditions, and the political pressure 
from the United States to participate in the “war on drugs” through harsh 
domestic sanctions placed on drug offenders.171  
The early statutes embodying the Japanese policy toward drug use 
have been supplemented by further legislation that built upon and expanded 
the existing foundation of Japan’s illicit substance policy.172  This legislation 
has increased the scope of Japan’s drug laws to include international efforts 
toward reducing the trafficking of illicit substances.173  As such, it represents 
a continuing effort by Japan to deal with the problem of substance abuse 
through aggressive enforcement of anti-drug laws and an overarching no-
tolerance policy. 
Within the context of the historically harsh and punitive treatment of 
drug offenders by the Japanese criminal justice system, the recent trend of 
acquittals in certain drug smuggling cases heard by the lay judge system 
takes on potential significance.  Although the overall acquittal rate of cases 
heard by lay judges over the first three years of the new system was only 
0.5%, there has been a statistically significant shift in the number of 
acquittals given in drug smuggling cases heard by lay judge panels.174  A 
common theme among the cases was the defendants’ testimony that they 
were unaware that drugs were contained in luggage they had been asked to 
carry by third parties while traveling.175  Under the historic policy of the 
Japanese criminal justice system to aggressively prosecute infractions of the 
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strict anti-drug legislation discussed above, it is unlikely that such a rate of 
acquittals would have been possible.  As such, this class of cases represents a 
concrete example of how implementing the lay judge system has materially 
decreased the conviction rate in the Japanese criminal justice system. 
This line of drug smuggling cases resulting in acquittals under the lay 
judge system is significant for two reasons.  First, these cases represent a 
significant departure from the prior system in terms of acquittal rates, and a 
countertrend to the tendency of lay judge panels to assign harsher penalties 
in sex crime cases than those previously assigned by professional judges.  
Although drug smuggling cases may represent a minority percentage of the 
overall number of those heard by lay judges, they demonstrate that the 
potential for variation from existing trends exists.  Such a marked 
divergence from the previous trends for this class of cases heard by lay 
judges acts as a counterpoint to the arguments that the lay judge system has 
been unsuccessful in its goal of altering the dynamics that existed under the 
previous system. 
The second reason that the series of acquittals for drug smuggling 
cases is significant lies in the nature of the cases and defendants.  Among the 
types of cases heard by the lay judge system, the drug smuggling cases that 
have resulted in acquittals have involved relatively sympathetic defendants.  
For example, those acquitted defendants have included senior citizens who 
credibly claimed that they were unaware that the drugs at issue were present 
in the luggage they had been asked to carry by third parties.176  Also, much 
of the Japanese criminal justice system’s aggression toward drug law 
infractions has been based on public policy concerns and the health of drug 
users themselves, rather than the harms inflicted on other victims.177  These 
factors may indicate that these drug smuggling cases represent the potential 
benefits offered by the lay judge system in cases that are less serious than 
those in which the conviction rate remains similar to those under the prior 
system.  Specifically, the variation in the conviction rate may indicate that 
the due process concerns raised by the 99.8% conviction rate under the 
previous system may be most effectively alleviated in cases other than the 
most serious offered by the criminal justice system.  As such, the leniency 
shown by lay judges in drug cases may indicate that the system is working 
as intended, possibly reducing the formalistic application of code provisions 
and the power of prosecutors over the trial process. 
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Due to the departure from the prior conviction rates seen in drug 
smuggling cases heard under the new lay judge system, along with the 
nature of the cases and defendants, this vein of cases demonstrates how the 
lay judge system may assist in protecting defendants’ rights and reducing 
prosecutors’ dominance in the trial process.  The lay judge system arguably 
has performed its intended purpose in the types of cases it is suited for, as 
drug smuggling cases are largely victimless crimes and acquitted defendants 
were generally unaware of their possession of drugs.  It appears that several 
of these cases are characterized by ordinary citizens credibly claiming that 
they were unaware of any wrongdoing, and thus may be distinguishable 
from the other types of serious cases heard by lay judge panels.178  As such, 
drug smuggling cases could represent the type of case in which an increased 
amount of variation in the outcome is indicative of greater respect for the 
due process rights of defendants.  This trend of cases demonstrates that the 
expansion of the scope of the lay judge system beyond its current limited 
scope may alleviate the due process concerns present under the old system, 
and thereby protect the rights of defendants in the Japanese criminal justice 
system. 
C. Future Reforms: Videotaping of Interrogations and Confessions 
Implementation of the lay judge system in Japan has also given 
renewed impetus to efforts to implement additional external checks on the 
criminal justice process.  One of the most significant of these has been the 
push for videotaping the interrogations of suspects and the resulting 
confessions.179  This practice has been adopted in numerous other countries, 
including England, Canada, Australia, and parts of the United States.180  
Under the historical practices of the Japanese criminal justice system, 
defense counsel would not be present during witness questioning sessions, 
and prosecutors would prepare a summarized version of the witness’s 
responses following questioning.181  Despite hearsay rules, these summaries 
were generally admitted either as a substitute for or in addition to in-court 
testimony, under exceptions that have been broadly interpreted.182  When 
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paired with the ability of prosecutors and police to hold suspects for 
extended periods of time, this practice understandably led to concerns about 
the veracity of confession statements. 
There have been long-standing calls for the implementation of 
external checks that would counteract these practices, with the most 
prominent being the push for videotaping confessions and interrogation 
sessions.183  Proponents of this reform argue that it would ensure that 
confessions are obtained voluntarily and are credible.184  Furthermore, this 
practice would serve as a direct check on police power in the interrogation 
room and thereby protect the due process rights of suspects.185
When the idea of videotaping interrogations was first proposed, it was 
met with significant opposition from prosecutors and police and was not 
adopted.186  However, with the advent of the lay judge system, the judiciary 
indicated it would more closely scrutinize confessions’ voluntariness.187  The 
inclusion of lay judges led to concerns that they may base their perceptions 
on the confession statement, and therefore judges likely raised their 
standards for determining voluntariness.188  In addition, the inclusion of lay 
judges in the trial process reduced the practicality of using written transcripts 
of interrogations during the trial process and concurrently emphasized the 
need for oral testimony.189  These concerns were paralleled by renewed calls 
for the videotaping of interrogations conducted by police and prosecutors in 
order to increase the transparency of the criminal justice process.190  These 
views and the renewed push for electronic recording of the interrogation 
process were at least partially in response to the implementation of the lay 
judge system.191  Consequently prosecutors began to partially videotape 
some criminal interrogations in August 2006, with the police following suit 
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in 2008.192  As such, although complete videotaping of interrogations has not 
yet begun, the lay judge system has demonstrated that it may serve as a 
driving force for future reforms implementing external checks on the 
Japanese criminal justice system. 
VI. THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM OF JAPAN SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO PROTECT 
THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS MORE FULLY
As discussed above, mixed panels of lay and professional judges only 
hear a narrow range of cases.193  These are limited to the most serious cases 
in the Japanese criminal justice system, those that are punishable by death, 
imprisonment for an indefinite period, or imprisonment with hard labor, and 
cases in which the victim died as a result of an intentional criminal act.194  
Arguably, the narrow range of cases heard and their serious nature has 
greatly contributed to the rate of acquittal under the lay judge system only 
being 0.5% of all the cases heard in the Japanese criminal courts.195  This 
possibility is supported by the fact that the subset of drug smuggling cases in 
which the defendants credibly professed ignorance of the presence of the 
drugs and were older citizens heard by lay judges have resulted in a 
surprising rate of acquittals.196  In light of the possibility that the lay judge 
system will more effectively reach its goals of increasing the protection of 
defendants’ due process rights and decreasing the influence of prosecutors, 
the scope of the lay judge system should be expanded to encompass a wider 
variety of criminal cases. 
As discussed above, the text of Japan’s Constitution accords 
defendants procedural due process protections.197  However, these rights 
have been interpreted very narrowly by judges in order to safeguard the high 
levels of prosecutorial discretion granted under the prior formulation of the 
Japanese criminal justice system.198  The lay judge system represents a 
means to enhance the protections provided to criminal defendants under the 
Japanese Constitution.  Although it is understandable that cases that merit 
the most serious criminal penalties may not lead to a high level of variation 
in conviction rates between the two systems, the trend of acquittals in drug 
smuggling cases suggests that less serious cases might be a rich forum for 
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lay judges to demonstrate a departure from the prior system.  This increase 
in acquittals could indicate that there will be a variation in the conviction 
rate as compared to that under the prior system in other types of cases, and 
highlights the potential shortcomings in the due process protections of the 
prior Japanese criminal justice system.  Therefore, expanding the lay judge 
system to apply to a greater variety of, if not all, criminal cases  would fulfill 
the spirit of the Japanese Constitution’s due process provisions by ensuring 
that a greater number of criminal defendants receive more balanced trials. 
Expanding the scope of the lay judge system would also benefit 
criminal defendants by decreasing prosecutorial power in a wider variety of 
cases.  As discussed above, prosecutors have historically played a very 
significant role in the criminal trial process, and their influence has been 
identified as a key factor in the 99.8% conviction rate under the previous 
system.199  This significance is compounded by the symbiotic relationship 
between police, the prosecutors, and courts under the old system.200  The lay 
judge system represents a means of decreasing the ability of prosecutors to 
dictate the course and outcome of criminal trials, as evidenced by the trend 
of acquittals in drug smuggling cases heard under this system.201  Formerly, 
the extremely high rate of conviction was universal across all types of cases, 
and thus any variation in conviction rates may be indicative of a significant 
change in the dynamics of the Japanese criminal justice system.  That it has 
occurred in a class of cases considered very serious in Japan arguably 
indicates that this trend could manifest itself in other types of cases beyond 
the current scope of the lay judge system.  Although one cannot predict with 
certainty the extent to which the rate of conviction would vary under an 
expanded lay judge system, it will result in a reduction of the 99.8% rate 
seen under the prior system. 
Another parallel phenomenon supporting the theory that lay judges 
counterbalance prosecutorial discretion is the actions of prosecutors 
themselves since the introduction of the lay judge system.  Specifically, the 
number of indictments in the categories of cases that will fall within the 
current scope of the lay judge system has dropped significantly.202  This may 
be due to prosecutors reducing the severity of charges and sentences sought 
in borderline cases in order to place the cases outside the lay judge system 
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and ensure that only a professional judge hears them.203  Although this is 
already beneficial to Japanese criminal defendants inasmuch as it limits the 
discretion of prosecutors to bring excessive charges, this practice suggests 
that it could exist beyond the current restricted scope of the lay judge 
system.   Expanding the scope of the system to encompass all criminal cases 
would further limit the discretion of prosecutors, and accord this heightened 
protection against potential abuses of discretion to the breadth of the 
Japanese criminal justice system.  Therefore, the expansion of the lay judge 
system represents an opportunity to address the problem of excessive 
prosecutorial discretion and power, and conversely increase the rights of 
Japanese criminal defendants.  As discussed above, previous attempts to 
correct the imbalance of power wielded by defense counsel and prosecutors 
did not achieve significant success.204  The implementation of the lay judge 
system has acted as an essential step toward fully realizing the potential of 
these measures as a means of reforming the Japanese criminal justice 
system.205
These factors indicate the potential benefits that may manifest upon 
expansion of the lay judge system to encompass all criminal cases in Japan.  
First, it may increase the power of the due process rights of defendants 
enunciated in the Japanese Constitution. This would take on special 
significance as a departure from previous case law that supported expanded 
prosecutorial discretion at the expense of defendants’ due process rights.  
Second, the lay judge system has already curtailed the extent of 
prosecutorial discretion by increasing the variety in trial outcomes in certain 
types of cases.  This limiting of prosecutorial discretion is further evidenced 
by the altered behavior of prosecutors themselves, as there has been a 
decrease in indictments of charges that would merit review by a mixed panel 
of lay and professional judges.  Increasing the scope of the lay judge system 
would further address the expansive role of prosecutors.  When coupled with 
the increased due process protections accorded defendants, this increase may 
substantially alleviate the existing concerns with the Japanese criminal 
justice system that have persisted despite institution of the lay judge system. 
Admittedly, expanding the lay judge system to be a mandatory 
requirement for all criminal cases is likely impracticable, in part due to the 
much higher demand for lawyers required for an expanded system and the 
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additional administrative costs associated with lengthier trials.  Therefore, 
two approaches that balance these concerns with increasing the protections 
accorded to defendants may be adopted.  First, reforms could mandate that 
all criminal trials in Japan be heard by lay judges, with the option for a 
defendant to opt out of their case being heard by a lay judge panel.  This 
provision would allow defendants an expeditious trial if they have given a 
bona fide, voluntary confession or otherwise decided not to contest the 
case.  Conversely, it would ensure that defendants challenging the charges 
against them are accorded the benefits of lay judge panels hearing their case.  
Although there may be a risk of many defendants opting out, such as to 
avoid negative publicity or due to pressure from the prosecution, this 
provision could be phased out as the lay judge system is adapted to its 
increased scope if this becomes an issue. 
Alternatively, the lay judge system could be expanded beyond its 
current narrow range of cases, as defined by the sentences assigned to those 
found guilty of the charge against them.  Under the current provisions of the 
Lay Assessor Act, lay judge panels only hear cases for crimes punishable by 
death, imprisonment for an indefinite period, or imprisonment with hard 
labor.206  Therefore, relatively few cases are heard by lay judge panels and 
those that are heard are very serious by nature.  The lay judge system could 
be expanded to include more tiers of the Japanese Criminal Code’s 
sentences, such as hearing cases involving crimes punishable by 
imprisonment without work and those carrying significant fines.207  This 
approach could be tailored to fit the current capabilities of the Japanese 
criminal justice system, and subsequently expanded if the capacity of the 
system is increased.  This method would allow for a gradual integration of 
the attendant costs of expanding the lay judge system, while providing its 
protections to a wider range of cases in the interim.  If necessary, this 
method could also include an opt-out provision that would allow defendants 
charged with lesser crimes to go through an attenuated trial in cases that are 
uncontested.  Regardless of which expansion scheme is adopted, increasing 
the scope of the lay judge system will offer greater protections to Japanese 
criminal defendants, and may be accomplished while balancing these 
benefits with the costs attendant with such an expansion. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
Historically, as a civil law-based system, the Japanese criminal justice 
system has limited the discretion of judges to act beyond the applicable code 
provisions in criminal cases.  In fact, Japanese judges may be incentivized to 
quickly process cases rather than ensure that the due process rights of 
criminal defendants are recognized.  Conversely, Japanese prosecutors have 
been accorded significant discretion and power throughout the trial process, 
including investigatory powers and controlling and supervising the carrying 
out of a sentence.  As a byproduct of this structure, the Japanese criminal 
justice system has been historically characterized by a conviction rate of 
99.8%.  Although both of these patterns have seen changes in recent years, 
due to greater judicial activism and the institution of reforms to alleviate 
prosecutorial influence, the high conviction rate and central role played by 
prosecutors have not been greatly altered. 
The lay judge system of Japan, in which citizens participate in the 
decision-making process of certain criminal trials, was instituted in 2009 to 
address this concerning dynamic.  Within the first three years of the lay 
judge system’s hearing of cases, the acquittal rate stood at only 0.5%.  
However, there were several promising trends.  For example, a significant 
number of acquittals were given in drug smuggling cases heard by lay 
judges.  Also, there has arguably been a decrease in the discretion of 
prosecutors since the institution of the lay judge system, as indicated by 
prosecutors deciding to bring charges that would avoid the case being heard 
by lay judges in borderline cases. 
The effects of the lay judge system on the conviction rate in drug 
smuggling cases, reduction in the influence of prosecutors over the trial 
process, and increased impetus given for further reforms indicate that the lay 
judge system should be expanded beyond its current scope to encompass a 
greater variety of criminal trials.  This increase in scope could either be 
accomplished by requiring that all criminal cases be heard by lay judge 
panels with an opt-out choice made available to defendants in uncontested 
cases, or widening the types of cases heard by lay judge panels based on the 
requested sentences.  Both approaches would more fully protect the due 
process rights of criminal defendants in the Japanese criminal justice system 
while balancing the increased costs attendant to such an expansion.  As such, 
expanding the lay judge system would serve to alleviate the concerns that 
served to drive the initial implementation of the lay judge system itself, and 
more fully protect the rights of Japanese criminal defendants. 
